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Abstract
Future social, political, economic and environmental changes will to a large extent be
propelled by the size, geographic distribution and demographic compilation of popu
lations. This article highlights the most important demographic shifts that the South African
society will be subject to in the next few decades, and considers some implications of
these changes for planning and policy making in South Africa. These changes are: a
sharp decline in the population growth rate, the progressive ageing of the population,
a continued decline in life expectancy, and a shift in the migration and distribution pat
terns of the population. These changes entail, amongst others that planners do not
need to assume a steep increase in population numbers in their projections of the future
needs of the population anymore. The rise in the number of the aged will, however,
pose very specific challenges to both planners and government, while the expected
increase in urbanisation will increase the demand for basic services as well as the pres
sure on existing infrastructure and facilities. 
TENDENSE EN VERANDERINGE IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE BEVOLK-
INGSTRUKTUUR: ENKELE IMPLIKASIES VIR BEPLANNING EN BELEIDMAK-
ING
Toekomstige sosiale, politieke, ekonomiese en omgewingsveranderinge sal tot ’n groot
mate deur die grootte, geografiese verspreiding en demografiese samestelling van be
volkings voortgestu word. Hierdie artikel belig die belangrikste demografiese verskuiwings
waaraan die Suid Afrikaanse samelewing in die volgende paar dekades onderwerp sal
word, en neem enkele implikasies van hierdie verandering vir beplanning en beleidmak
ing in behandeling. Hierdie veranderinge is: ’n skerp afname in die bevolkingsgroeiko
ers; die toenemende veroudering van die bevolking; ’n voortgesette daling in lewens
verwagting, en ’n verskuiwing in die migrasie  en verspreidingspatrone van die bevolk
ing. Hierdie veranderinge behels onder meer dat beplanners nie meer nodig het om ’n
skerp toename in bevolkingsgetalle te veronderstel by die bepaling van die toekom
stige behoeftes van die bevolking nie. Die styging in die getal ouer mense sal egter baie
spesifieke uitdagings aan sowel beplanners as die staat stel, terwyl die verwagte toe
name in verstedeliking die eis vir basiese dienste, asook die druk op bestaande infra
struktuur en fasiliteite, sal laat toeneem. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Changes in the growth, mortalityand settlement patterns ofhuman populations have in
the past been described as “the single
most important set of events to occur
in human history”, and as “the leading
edge of social change in the modern
world” (Weeks, 2002: 1, 37). The past
70 to 100 years have indeed been
characterised by the most dramatic
demographic changes in the history
of humankind – changes which have
not only fundamentally affected the
structure and organisation of societies,
groups and institutions within societies,
but also the physical environment with
in which these processes function. Like
wise, the future social, political, eco
nomic and environmental changes will
largely be driven by the emergent size,
geographic distribution and demo
graphic composition of populations.
Population data are therefore right
fully considered as one of the most
fundamental pieces of information
needed in planning and policy making
(McCarthy & Rogerson, 1992). An
understanding of current and future
demographic change is thus of vital
importance to inform planning and
decision making at local, regional and
national level. 
Demographic change is, of course, by
no means a novelty peculiar to the
present era; yet, the specific nature of
demographic change in the modern
era does, however, pose increasingly
unique challenges in respect of the
management and priorities of insti
tutions, communities and governments.
All over the world various countries
have been obliged to adapt to these
changes, and they will be forced to
continue doing so in the future if gov
ernments wish to improve, or even
merely maintain, the quality of life of
* This article is a thorough adaptation of the author’s professorial inaugural lecture delivered
on 2 June 2004.




their populations. The nature of current
trends and projected changes in re
spect of the South African population
clearly indicates that parallel changes,
which are in various stages globally,
serve to show the way for some of the
demographic challenges which will
have to be met locally by the author
ities over the next few decades. 
Against the above background this
article elucidates the most important
demographic shifts to which the South
African population will be subjected
over the next few decades, and some
implications of these changes for poli
cy making and planning in South
Africa are explored. Internationally
there exists various demographic
models used by many authoritative
agencies and planners and commen
tators often have to attempt to thread
their way through a maize of under
lying premises and even divergent
projections. Yet, the scope of this arti
cle does not allow for attention to the
technical aspects of demographic
models, nor to assess the merit of the
various models. The argument and
elucidation of this article are largely
underscored by the 2003 demographic
projection models of the United Nations
Population Division (UNPD). The UNPD
makes provision for six variant pro
jections, each with specific assump
tions in respect of fertility, mortality
and migration. All the projections in
this article are based on the medium
variant projection – the most likely
scenario for South Africa in view of
current demographic trends.
To start off with, some of the most
important demographic changes cur
rently occurring internationally are
pointed out, because they largely
serve as markers of what South Africa
can expect in terms of demographic
changes in the next few decades.
2. MAIN FEATURES OF DEMO-
GRAPHIC CHANGE IN THE
GLOBAL POPULATION 
Internationally there is general con
sensus concerning various aspects of
future population trends: In all demo
graphic projections of the UNDP and
other international agencies, the trends
in world population point to at least
three primary changes: 
• a decline in population growth
rates (especially in industrial
countries); 
• a gradual ageing of populations;
and
• increased momentum in migra
tion patterns, with inter alia in
creasing urbanisation as one of
the most important character
istics of this process.
In summary, the main features of these
global demographic processes are:
2.1 A (further) decline in
population growth rates
Population research and demographic
literature of the 1960s to 1980s were
typified by horrifying images and
prophecies of doom concerning the
consequences of a worldwide popu
lation explosion. Since the beginning
of the 1990s, these images have grad
ually made way for the reality of dras
tic declines in the birth rate in various
regions of the world – a decline which
is now threatening to “become one
of the biggest crises of the 21st centu
ry” (Du Toit, 2004: 19). The collapse of
population numbers, especially in
Europe, Russia and Japan, is being
described by observers as ‘alarming’,
unique in the history of humankind and
the most dramatic demographic inter
vention since the bubonic plague rav
aged the European population during
the Middle Ages. The total fertility rate1
(TFR) for Europe as a whole has already
declined to 1.4 – far below the demo
graphic replacement level of 2.1 (PRB,
2004: 3). This progressively declining
fertility rate has far reaching impli
cations. Declining population numbers
will force especially rich countries in
future to rely more and more on immi
gration in an attempt to maintain their
economies. So, for example, the UNPD
estimates that to maintain a workforce
of 87 million until 2050 and beyond,
Japan will have to take in 609 000
immigrants annually to cushion the
local workforce deficit (UNPD, 2003).
Throughout history, population growth
has been an important source of eco
nomic growth: more people create an
increased demand for products, more
job opportunities, and a greater supply
to employers. Though economic
models theorise about the possibility
of economic growth in the midst of
declining population numbers, the fact
remains that proven examples of some
thing like this actually happening have
never been documented – simply be
cause this has never yet transpired.
The trend towards declining birth and
mortality figures, especially in indus
trialised countries – caused by ever ris
ing standards of living – will continue
within the next few decades, though
the world population in general will
continue to grow. In the less developed
countries of Africa, Asia and Latin
America populations still continue to
grow relatively fast – especially in abso
lute terms – even though growth rates
have here also declined sharply since
the 1970s. Approximately 99% of the
world’s natural population growth (i.e.
births minus deaths, but excluding
migration) is currently occurring in the
less developed countries, and this trend
will persist in the future (Pelser & Botes,
2003; Pelser, 2004b). 
One of the most important economic
consequences of a birth rate in free fall
is a decrease in the numbers of pro
ductive workers, while there is a sharp
rise in the numbers of the elderly.
Worldwide this leads to a systematic
ageing of populations. 
DINTLHA LE DIPHETOHO KA SEBOPEHO SA BAAHI BA AFRIKA BORWA:
DITLAMORAO TSE TOBANENG HO ETSA DIPOLANE LE DIPOLISI
Diphetoho tse tlang tsa phedisano, dipolotiki, le ekonomi di tla amiwa haholoholo ke
boholo, kabo ya jeografi le sebohe sa demografi ya baahi. Lengolo lena le hlahisa
diphetoho tse bohlokwa ka ho fetisisa tse baahi ba Afrika Borwao ba tla tobanang le
ona dilemong tse mmalwa tse tlang, hape e shebana le ditlamorao tsa diphetoho tsena
bakeng sa ho etsa maano le melao mo Afrika Borwa. Diphetoho tsena ke: ho theola
haholo ha dipalo tsa ho hola baahing, ho tsofala ha baahi bo tswellang pele, ho the
ola ho tswellang pele ha dilemo tse ho lebeletsweng ho phela ka ona, le diphetoho mokg
weng wa phallelo le arolelo ya baahi. Diphetoho tsena di kenyeletsa, ho tse ding, hore
ba etsang dipolane ba se nahane hape ka keketseho e nyolosetsang ya dipalo tsa
baahi ditekanyetsong tsa bona ka ditlhoko tsa nako e tlang ya baahi. Empa keketseho
dipalong tsa maqheku e tla fana ka mathata a ikgethang ho ba polanang le mmuso, ha
keketseho e lebeletsweng ya batho ba yang ho dula ditoropong e tla eketsa ho hloke
ha ha ditshebeletso tse motheo hape le ho tlisa kgatello disebedisong tse teng. 
1. The total fertility rate is the average number
of children per woman in the 15 49 year
age cohort in a specific region or country.
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2.2 A gradual ageing of the
world population
Arguably the most defining demo
graphic trend of this century, which is
set to have a far reaching impact on
the structure of the world’s population
in coming decades, is the progressive
ageing of populations, specifically the
increase in the proportion and numbers
of those older than 65 years (Table 1).
In the period 2000 to 2010, the average
annual growth rate of the group older
than 65 years will probably be 1.9%
(the most rapid growth rate for any
age cohort in the world population),
as opposed to 1.3% per annum for the
total world population. For the first time
ever, many countries have entered an
era in which there are more people
above 60 years than below five. In
some countries the extent of this age
ing process could even determine the
nature of politics, the economic growth
rate and international gravitas
(Brynard, 2004).
Worldwide the ageing of populations
poses an increasing challenge, though
developing countries face the most
serious challenges in this respect. Due
to the fact that less developed coun
tries are home to more than 80% of
the world population, nearly 75% of
these older people will live in de
veloping countries, while the largest
percentage increase among the older
population will occur in the poorest
regions. From a policy and planning
perspective, there is, however, graver
concern about the total extent (abso
lute numbers) of the ageing popu
lation than about their percentage
share of the total population. One of
the most important implications of this
ageing trend is that state budgets will
have to be adjusted so as to deal with
this new demographic imbalance.
Growing older populations bring much
pressure to bear on the state, and
numerous developing countries are
already unable to address the health,
housing and financial needs of the
elderly component. Ageing popu
lations and the challenges that they
pose to the state are, however, by no
means confined to developing coun
tries. Even industrial countries are ex
periencing difficulty in finding mech
anisms for providing especially health
care and financial support to this popu
lation cohort. Countries like Germany,
France, Spain, Italy and Japan will
have to spend between one quarter
and one third of their domestic product
on pensions and health care before
the current generation of thirty year
olds reach retirement age. Economists
in the United States of America opine
that serious budgetary problems may
surface as early as 2008 when millions
of so called baby boomers – the large
number of babies born after World
War II between 1946 and 1964 – reach
retirement age (Brynard, 2004). For
example, state expenditure on pen
sions in Germany will in 2040 rise from
an already high 10.3% of the Gross
National Product to 15.4%, while the
number of economically active workers
who have to support each one of
those who have retired, will drop from
2.6 to 1.4 (Du Toit, 2004). Developing
countries – and Africa in general with
her Nepad2 vision – are heading for a
bleak future as a result of the eco
nomic impediments which industrial
ised countries experience because of,
amongst others, ageing populations.
Economic aid from the latter will in
future increasingly be forced inwards,
so that the flow of aid to Africa and
other developing areas will gradually
diminish.
2.3 Increased momentum in
global migration patterns
Considering past and current migration
trends, all developing regions (Africa,
Asia, Latin America) are projected to
show a net migration loss in future
decades, while the more developed
regions (Europe, North America) will
show a net migration gain. One
prominent outcome of increasing
migration trends is that the majority of
the population in every region of the
world will be living in cities by 2030.
Only two of the ten biggest urban
areas projected for 2010 will be in
more developed countries (Tokyo,
Japan and New York, USA). The rest of
these mega cities will be in less de
veloped countries – countries which
are in many cases already battling to
provide the required basic services in
respect of clean water, sanitation,
sewerage and waste management. 
Against this backdrop, the following
section reviews the main demographic
trends and changes to be expected
in the South African population struc
ture within the next few decades. 
3. EXPECTED TRENDS AND
CHANGES IN THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POPULATION
STRUCTURE IN THE NEXT
FEW DECADES
Demographic change in South Africa
broadly correlates with general demo
graphic shifts currently occurring glob
ally. In the midst of apparent similari
ties with the projected changes be
tween the global and South African
populations, there is, however, one
important difference. Current changes
in the world population – and thus also
projected changes – are largely attrib
uted to transitional phases of demo
graphic change as the quality of life
of populations increases and socio
economic development accelerates.
Yet, in South Africa – in fact, in all of
southern Africa in particular – many of
the current and expected changes
will rather emanate from an unfore
seen, extreme influence on the popu
lation structure, namely the effect of
HIV/AIDS. At the beginning of the 1990s
2. New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Table 1: Proportion of population 65 years and older in different regions of
the world: 2000 2050
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003: Online
Regions
% of population 65 years and
older
% increase in total
population 65 years
and older 
2000 2025 2050 (2000 2025)
World 6.9 10.5 15.9 96.3
Africa 3.2 4.2 6.8 113.7
Latin America 5.5 9.9 18.2 139.2
Asia 5.9 10.0 16.8 119.7
North America 12.3 18.1 20.5 83.2
Europe 14.7 21.3 27.9 38.3
Oceania 9.8 14.7 19.1 92.7
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few observers predicted the present
extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and
it was generally accepted that the
epidemic would have little influence
on the population structure of even
seriously affected countries. In fact, up
to the mid 1990s population projec
tions worldwide very seldom, if ever,
took into consideration any expected
effects of epidemics or disasters (like
famine) (Pelser, 2004a). The AIDS epi
demic has, however, changed all of
this.
Taking into account the current and
projected demographic changes in
the South African population, at least
four main demographic trends can be
identified which are not only set to
change the country’s population struc
ture fundamentally in the next few
decades, but which will also have far
reaching planning and policy making
implications. 
3.1 Change 1: A (continued)
sharp decline in the popu-
lation growth rate and a
concomitant decline in the
absolute population size
The demographic scenarios of the
1980s and early 1990s which predicted
strong growth in the South African
population, have in the past few years
changed dramatically, on the grounds
firstly of proof that the fertility rate is
declining drastically and, secondly, as
a result of the more recent impact of
HIV/AIDS. Most projections show,
depending on their underlying assump
tions, that the South African population
will, within a few decades, reflect a
slight to considerable decline in num
bers. The annual growth rate of the
total population is projected, in keep
ing with the declining fertility rate, to
drop from the current 0.59% to an
average rate of 0.17% for the period
2005 2010, and further to 0.33% for the
period 2020 2025 (Table 2). 
The growth rate of the population is
linked to two other directly related
processes: the crude birth rate3 and
the crude mortality rate.4 The crude
birth rate is of particular significance
to policy makers and planners, be
cause it is more closely linked with the
annual number of births in a population
than is the fertility rate. The crude birth
rate of all the population groups in
South Africa declined markedly dur
ing the past 20 years, and indications
are that the decline will persist in the
next few decades. This can partially
be ascribed to the fact that the HIV
prevalence rate is proportionally high
er among people who are in their re
productive period. Consequently, a
relative large percentage of women
will not complete their reproductive
period – i.e. women in the age group
15 to 49 years (Pelser, Ngwena &
Summerton, 2004). 
The trend in respect of the declining
birth rate in South Africa and other
countries is usually associated with the
process of modernisation and people’s
aspiring to a higher quality of life. How
ever, specifically in South Africa, this
trend is accelerated by the impact of
HIV/AIDS, as is clearly reflected in the
strong increase in the crude death
rate. Table 3 shows the historical and
projected situation in respect of the
crude birth and death rates for South
Africa. 
Table 3 reflects, among others, that if
the current underlying factors and
assumptions remain constant, South
Africa in the next two decades will
see an increase of more than 30% in
the crude death rate. In fact, all indi
cations are that the death rate is set
to rise sharply within the next ten years,
until it reaches an historical high in the
period 2010 to 2015 – an increase of
more than 38% measured against the
corresponding figure for the period
2000 2005 (Table 3). During the period
1990 1995, the crude death rate
reached an historical low of 8.1 per
1000 of the population. This would
then mean that the death rate of the
South African population – within a
20 year period – will have swung from
an historical low (8.1 per 1000 of the
population in late 1995) to an histori
cal high (23.4 per 1000 of the popula
tion in late 2015) – a rise of 189%.
Under “normal” circumstances, and
as a population enjoys a rise in quality
of life and especially life expectancy
as a result of socio economic progress,
the crude death rate drops. In South
Africa this process will, however, be
reversed, and the blame for this rever
sal can largely be laid at the door of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic,5 and then
more specifically the country’s inabili
ty to curb the spread and impact of
the epidemic. The implications of this
are far reaching and will affect virtu
ally all walks of life, as is actually al
ready the case. 
The expected net result of current
trends and projected changes in the
population growth rate, and also in
the crude birth/death rate, is a decline
in population size. Table 4 shows the
medium term projection for South
Africa according to the projection
models of the United Nations Popu
lation Division (UNPD) and the Popu
lation Reference Bureau (PRB). Though
both models take the impact of HIV/
AIDS into consideration, it is important
to point out that their underlying
assumptions in respect of migration,
mortality and fertility rates (may) dif
fer. In spite of such differences, both
models agree that South Africa is
heading for a decline in population
numbers. Over the next five decades,
and based on the population size in
Table 2: Comparative changes in the South African population growth
rate (2000 2025)
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003: Online
Region
Projected change in population growth rate (%)
2000-2005 2005-2010 2020-2025
World 1.22 1.13 0.81
Africa 2.20 2.06 1.69
South Africa 0.59 0.17 0.33
3. The number of babies born alive (expressed
per 1000 members of the population) for
a specific period.
4. The number of deaths (expressed per
1000 members of the population) for a
specific period.
5. A relatively high crude death rate can also
occur as a result of a particularly “old”
population profile, as in the case of
Sweden, for instance. In South Africa and
in many other developing countries how
ever, the current and projected increase
in the death rate is not ascribed to the
ageing of the population, but to the
impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
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2003, this decline could be as much
as 10% to 11%.6
3.2 Change 2: Progressive
ageing of the South
African population
One of the most important changes in
the structure of the South African
population – in line with international
trends – relates linked to the ageing
of the population. Although approxi
mately one third of the South African
population is currently still 14 years or
younger, the population is, demo
graphically, deemed to be “adult”7
because of the relatively large pro
portion of persons 65 years and older.
Despite the projected high mortality
rate, the proportion of older persons
will systematically increase in the fol
lowing decades, until by the year 2050
approximately one in ten people in the
country will fall within the age cohort
65 and older (Table 5). The group 65
years and older is the only age cate
gory in the South African population
which will, in the next few decades,
experience a sharp increase, both in
absolute and proportional terms (UNPD
2003). In contrast to all other age cat
egories which are projected to enter
a period of declining numbers and
proportions, the numbers of those older
than 65 years will increase by approxi
mately 110% in the next two decades,
and by approximately 135% in the next
50 years.
In contrast to what is the case with
younger age groups, it is highly unlike
ly that the AIDS epidemic will have a
significant effect on the structure of
the age group above 65 years. This
means that the life expectancy for the
latter group – in contrast to other age
groups – will continue to rise. This sys
tematic ‘greying’ of the South African
population will cause similar political,
economic and social problems as
those with which governments in many
developed countries are already
grappling. 
3.3 Change 3: A constant
decline in life expectancy
to 2015-2020, with a
subsequent gradual
increase
In line with international trends, the
South African population has since
the 1960s shown a rise in life expect
ancy, together with a decline in the
death rate. As a result of the increased
mortality rate caused by HIV/AIDS, this
trend has been reversed in the past
decade, and life expectancy will con
tinue to decrease for at least the next
10 to 15 years. In fact, the HIV/AIDS
epidemic is rapidly obliterating all the
progress made in life expectancy in
South Africa over the past 30 years.8
Life expectancy at birth for the total
population is projected to decline from
approximately 62 years at the begin
ning of the 1990s to more or less 43
Table 4: Medium term change in the South African population size: 2003
2050
Year Population (mil-lion) (PRB)
Population (mil-
lion) (UNPD)
% change since base
year (2003-2050)
PRB UNPD
Mid 2003 46.9 44.7
2025 44.6 42.9 4.9 4.0
2050 41.7 40.2 11.1 10.1
Sources:Population Reference Bureau, 2004: 4; United Nations Population Division, 2003: Online
Table 3: Change in the crude birth and death rates of the South African population (1960 2025)
Indicator
Projected change (per 1 000 members of the population) Change
1960-1965 1980-1985 1990-1995 2000-2005 2010-2015 2020-2025 2005-2025
(Crude) birth rate 41.6 33.9 28.3 22.6 20.1 18.4 18.6%
(Crude) death rate 16.7 10.2 8.1 16.9 23.4 22.0 30.2%
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003: Online
7. Demographically speaking, a population
is considered to be “young” when fewer
than 4% of the population are older than
65; in “adult” populations between 4%
and 7% of the population are older than
65, while an “old” population is where
more than 7% of the population are older
than 65.
8. Life expectancy at birth is internationally
considered to be an important indicator
of the general level of health and quality
of life in a country.
Table 5: Long term change in the age category 65 years and older in the
South African population (2000 2050)




2010 2.269 5.0 39.5
2025 3.421 8.0 110.3
2050 3.826 9.5 135.3
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003:  Online
6. This scenario could change if the govern
ment can intercede successfully in treating
those who are HIV positive or who are
already showing signs of AIDS. If a 100%
implementation rate of antiretroviral treat
ment has been achieved by 2005, the
population can continue to grow and can
eventually stabilize at approximately 52
million people by 2010 (Department of
Social Development, 2004).
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years by 2015 2020, yet maintaining
persistently sharp differences between
the four main population groups.9 A
projected life expectancy of 43 years
represents the same level encoun
tered in South Africa by the middle of
the 20th century. After the period
2015 2020, as the HIV/AIDS epidemic
reaches ‘saturation point’ in respect
of the death rate, life expectancy for
the total population ought gradually
to rise to approximately 54 years by
2035 and 56 years by 2045 2050
(Table 6).
3.4 Change 4: A shift in
migration patterns and
population distribution
When it comes to changing migration
patterns, it is necessary to take cog
nizance of at least two prominent
trends in the South African popula
tion. These trends are, firstly, the net
loss of highly skilled labour power as a
result of a high official emigration rate
and, secondly (like elsewhere in the
world), the increasing movement from
rural to urban areas. Both trends involve
far reaching and complicated long
term consequences for a whole range
of development initiatives and sectors
in the country.
3.4.1 Changing patterns of
across-border migration
Official statistics reveal that in 2003
South Africa showed a net annual
migration loss for the tenth consecu
tive year. The official net migration
loss for the period 1994 to 2003 amounts
to some 50 000 persons. However, a
CSIR study claims that three times as
many South Africans may have emi
grated between 1996 and 2001 as the
official Stats SA figure of 60 000 indi
cates. Since 1994 an estimated 458 000
members of the white population have
emigrated from South Africa. Of these
almost one third were highly skilled
professionals between the ages of 25
and 39. (There are insufficient data to
determine emigration patterns for
other population groups) (SAIRR, 2004).
The official migration loss experienced
by South Africa in the past decade
does not, however, provide for the
presence and continued influx of ille
gal immigrants. There are vastly diver
gent estimates of the actual number
of illegal immigrants in the country,
varying between 100 000 to as many
as 12 million, with most observers esti
mating a figure of between 2 and 4
million (Pelser, 2004a). Projections show
that this trend is set to persist and
probably intensify in coming decades.
More and more people from Africa,
Latin America and south east Asia
seek refuge not only in the industri
alised countries, but also in some de
veloping countries like South Africa,
which are relatively easy to reach,
have less effective monitoring systems
and hold promise of a better future. 
3.4.2 Increasing rural-to-urban
migration
South Africa has by far the largest
urbanised population of all countries
in southern Africa, and even though
expectations are that future migration
to urban centres will slow down, the
momentum of population growth in
the country’s main metropolitan areas
will persist for the next few decades
(Table 7). Provision of land, housing
units and services will pose major chal
lenges and bring further pressure to
bear on the natural environment.
4. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE





South African society is in many re
spects a microcosm of demographic
change, as well as of the concomi
tant social, economic and political
issues which are associated with such
change elsewhere in the world. More
specifically, over the next few decades
the expected demographic changes
will pose unique problems with specif
ic challenges to planners and policy
makers. Some of these problems and
challenges emanating from the
changing population structure can
be outlined by means of a few signifi
cant implications.
4.1 Implication 1: A marked
increase in population
numbers is no longer a
valid premise in planning
considerations
One of the tasks of a planner is to
advise on spatial arrangement for
future use on the basis of demographic
trends (Steÿn, 1996: 34). An analysis of
spatial demographic trends is thus im
portant to inform socio economic and
planning imperatives such as decisions
regarding regional development,
urban size policy or planning for the
provision of housing, as well as the
number and spatial distribution of
facilities such as schools and hospitals.
Changes in the structure, composition
and size of the population thus hold a
range of implications for spatial
arrangement. 
In contrast to what was the case 10 or
20 years ago, policy makers, planners
Table 6: Comparative change in life expectancy of the South African,
world and African populations (1990 2025)
Period World Africa South Africa
1990 1995 63.8 51.1 61.8
2000 2005 65.4 48.9 47.7
2010 2015 67.2 51.0 41.5
2020 2025 69.1 54.9 45.0
2045 2050 74.3 64.9 55.7
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2003:  Online
Table 7: Increase in the South
African urban popula
tion: 1950 2025







9. If the South African government manages
to achieve a 100% implementation rate of
ART by 2005, this will keep the life expect
ancy at approximately 50 until 2010 (Depart
ment of Social Development, 2004).
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and administrators in South Africa no
longer have to allow for a marked in
crease in population numbers in their
calculations concerning the future
needs of the South African popula
tion. It is a fact that when long term
planning and needs analyses are
based on population data – irrespec
tive of the service sector – it cannot,
nor dare not, be done in isolation from
the larger processes and forces in
which these sectors operate. Lessons,
particularly from European countries,
teach us that circumspection will be
required especially where new long
term infrastructure – schools, suburbs
and even town planning – is being
considered; in short: any long term
planning based on the historical prem
ise of a constant increase in numbers
as a justification or source for such de
velopment, could potentially be fun
damentally affected by the projected
decline in the population growth rate
and population figures. Spatially, the
projected changes mean, amongst
other things, a decrease in the num
ber of school sites10 to be provided
during the next few decades, while
planning will simultaneously have to
provide for sites suitable for institution
al use – orphanages,11 health care
facilities and care centres for the aged.
Together with a rethinking of spatial
organisation, attention will also have
to be devoted to planning for basic
services needs. One example is water
provisioning. In the early 1980s, concern
was expressed that the population
growth rate of the day would eventu
ally test the balance between the
country’s then projected population
of 80 million people by 2020 in respect
of the availability of fresh water sources
– a concern which was one of the
contributory justifications for the intro
duction of the Population Development
Programme in 1984. Declining fertility
rates and rising mortality rates, result
ing amongst others from the impact
of HIV/AIDS, indicate that the popu
lation will cease growing in the pres
ent decade and will eventually sta
bilise at between 48 and 52 million
people (South Africa. Department of
Social Development, 2004). The cur
rent concern about water revolves
around the distribution of and access
to the resource, thus addressing the
wrongs of the previous political dispen
sation. The focus will, in other words,
shift to future water provision and
access to clean water, especially in
growing urban areas. New, different
demographic shifts, like continued
urbanization and the ‘greying’ of the
population, in other words mean that
planners will more often than has been
the case up to now, be confronted
by new challenges, as will later be
explained.




Increasing AIDS related morbidity (dis
ease) and mortality (deaths), and a
consequently decreased life expect
ancy are sure to affect national de
velopment objectives negatively. The
ever increasing HIV prevalence rate
(nationally at 27.9% according to the
annual antenatal clinic survey of the
Department of Health in 2003) not only
triggers and accelerates demographic
change; the overall development
potential of the country and its people
is also seriously affected. For example, it
is estimated that more than a quarter
of the economically active population
will be infected with HIV by 2006 (Pelser,
Ngwena & Summerton, 2004). In eco
nomic terms, the expected declines
in productivity and life expectancy will
lead, amongst others, to a situation
where South Africa will for the foresee
able future remain trapped in the
bottom half of the Human Develop
ment Index,12 this despite progress
having been made in other fields like
literacy and per capita income. 
Various other development issues and
challenges are already crystallising out
of the interaction between the rising
mortality rate and declining life expect
ancy. What causes particular concern
is the fact that ever increasing pro
portions of the state budget may have
to be allocated to health and welfare
services – this of necessity to the detri
ment of other priorities like education,
infrastructure, the legal system and job
creation projects, to name but a few.
Although the Government’s policy
change in respect of the provision of
anti retroviral treatment (ART) repre
sents an important step towards
relieving the impact of the epidemic,
the authorities will have to do much
more to address the fundamental
factors feeding the spread of the dis
ease. The social breeding ground of
the virus – poverty, ignorance, gender
inequality, high risk sexual behaviour,
cultural misconceptions and behaviour,
sexual violence, etcetera – will flourish
until more determined and focused
policy programmes are put in place
to address these factors. Yet, the suc
cess of such programmes depends on,
firstly, a stronger and more explicit
acknowledgement by the authorities
of the scope, gravity, dynamics and
impact of the epidemic, and, second
ly, on the political will to implement the
necessary measures with dedication. 
4.3 Implication 3: Distinctive
needs of and planning for
a progressively ageing
population
The increase in the numbers of the
population older than 65 years will in
creasingly put a financial burden on
both the state and the economically
active sector of the population. How
ever, should a quarter of the eco
nomically active sector be affected
with HIV in 2006, as the projections indi
cate, it will most certainly adversely
affect the earning capacity and also
the concomitant capacity for support
of this sector. The fact is that the basic
demographic problem firmly remains:
In the future a larger proportion of the
population (above 65 years) will be
economically inactive in the pro
duction of goods and services, but they
will continue to lay (proportionally
growing) claim to such goods and
services. 
What are the potential macro
economic effects of an ageing popu
lation? As there is a more rapid in
crease in the numbers of those older
than 65 years than in any other age
category of the population, this demo
10. Current demographic projections of the
UNPD, for example, show that the number
of South Africans in the 17 years and younger
age cohort will constantly and system
atically decrease from 17.900 million in 2000
to 10.932 million by 2050  thus a decline
of some 39% in the absolute numbers of
the school going age cohort.
11. By the end of 2004 South Africa had an
estimated 600 000 orphans. Earlier pro
jections (disregarding ART) estimated the
number of orphans at 2 million by 2014,
mainly as a result of the effects of HIV/AIDS.
The implementation of ART could halve the
projected number of orphans, yet the
present number will still increase by some
two thirds in the following decade (Depart
ment of Social Development, 2004).
12. Life expectancy is one of three components
used to determine a country’s/ region’s/
group’s position on the Human Develop
ment Index; the others are level of edu
cation and per capita income.
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graphic shift will, in coming decades,
exert a marked impact on state
finances. Questions which will inter
alia have to be answered are closely
linked to the levels of benefits payable
to retired persons, the age at which
people will in future qualify for state
benefits, and of course, the constitu
tional responsibility of the state in
respect of health care for this group –
a group which proportionally makes
bigger claims on health care than any
other age cohort.13 Quite clearly this
means that the financial care of the
older generation will require rethinking
and fresh planning, because there is
little doubt that there will be a marked
increase in the future dependency
burden to be borne by the economi
cally active generation in respect of
the elderly. As a result of HIV/AIDS, the
economic active population are,
however, fighting their own battle and
are making equally strong demands
on limited government resources, so
that it will require exceptional expert
ise and insights to allocate state funds
equitably and to balance diverse
interests. It would, however, appear
that future economic realities in South
Africa will leave the state with little
room for providing large scale finan
cial support to the older generation,
this in spite of the need and pressure
which will build up for such aid. The
fact is that government expenditure
on social grants increased from R10
billion to R24.5 billion during the
decade 1994 2003, while the total
number of beneficiaries of state grants
increased from 3.2 million in April 2000
to 7.3 million in November 2003 (South
Africa. Department of Social Develop
ment, 2004). This means that already
one in six South Africans depends on
some kind of government grant for
financial survival14 – a ratio which will
probably in future increase as a grow
ing proportion of older people quali
fies for government grants and applies
for them. Simulation studies have
shown that, in the absence of any
government grants, 55.9% of older
people will live in poverty, while 38.2%
of older people will live in ultra pover
ty without the support of such grants
(South Africa. Department of Social
Development, 2004). 
A second area which already poses
particular challenges in respect of the
care of the elderly is that of housing,
specifically state facilities for caring
for the elderly. By the end of 2002 there
were only seven state homes for the
elderly in South Africa with a total
capacity of 794 places (South Africa.
Department of Social Development
2002). If the private sector is added,
the total number of subsidized homes
for the elderly in South Africa came to
474 – a steep decline from the 571 in
1999.15 The most state subsidised
homes are in the two most urbanised
provinces, Gauteng and Western
Cape, while provinces like Eastern
Cape and KwaZulu Natal, with the
largest concentration of older persons,
have fewer homes. Lessons learned
elsewhere clearly show that the age
ing of the population which we will
face in the next few decades will be
unparalleled and that this situation
already requires unparalleled inter
ventions and solutions.
4.4 Implication 4: Increased
urbanisation increases
both demand for basic
services and pressure on
existing infrastructure
The 2001 census data reveal that more
than 20% of the population in the main
metropolitan areas – as well as in some
of the regional centres and smaller
towns – are migrants. Except for the
effect which this trend has on the large
urban complexes in Gauteng and
Western Cape, the trend also has the
opposite effect on rural provinces like
Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and
Limpopo. Planning for and providing
community services and amenities will
have to be brought in line with urban
isation trends and internal migration
patterns so as to handle the needs and
claims of the growing urban popula
tion. However, at the same time, rural
areas will have to be developed and
serviced to promote sustainable
human development. 
The expected increase in urbanisation
over the next few decades and the
challenge which this will pose must be
viewed in conjunction with other
national issues like the existing levels of
poverty, unemployment and housing
backlogs. A major challenge facing
specifically the housing sector will be
to satisfy the growing demand for
housing – brought about by the de
crease in household size from 4.5 in
1996 to 3.8 in 2001 (Statistics South
Africa, 2003). The Department of Social
Development has the following re
sponse to this challenge: “This [the
change in household size] translates
into an increase of two million addi
tional households over and above
that generated by population growth
[during this period]. It is expected that
the demand for housing will double as
a result of this phenomenon” (South
Africa. Department of Social Develop
ment, 2004: 7). Against this background
the continued existence and probable
expansion of informal settlements in
urban areas will require a substantial
and costly increase in services like
water, sewerage, waste management
and health care facilities. This not only
has implications in respect of fiscal
allocations, but also for approaching
spatial development, including the
identification of areas with potential
concentrations of absolute poverty
and the interventions required in
sending communities.
The provision of cemeteries is yet an
other facet of spatial planning which
will have to receive the attention of
planners. The projected increase in
deaths16 resulting from a rising mortali
ty rate will exert greater pressure on
the land use needs of the burgeoning
urban population (Steÿn, 1996: 32).
Other critical current and future policy
issues accompanying growth in South
African cities are those associated
with a lack of dependable sources of
energy, a lack of safe water, inade
quate waste management and pollu
tion control, as well as the occupation
and degrading of fragile environments
like wetlands and indigenous forests.
An increase in urban growth will
decidedly pose bigger challenges in
respect of the planning and manage
ment of these and other issues
13. In the USA, for example, the frequency
with which state health services are used
by a person above 65 is approximately
27% more than that of a person in a
younger age cohort (du Toit, 2004).
14. The Department of Social Development is
currently responsible for the administra
tion of seven types of income grants. They
are targeted at older persons, persons
with disabilities, poor children, war veter
ans, foster care, and grants to support
families who care for children and the
needy.
16. By 2011 a cumulative total of more than 5
million people in South Africa will have
died as a result of AIDS related diseases.
By 2021 this figure could increase to 9 10
million (Van Tonder, 2004).
15. The decline can largely be attributed to
financial factors which led to the closing
down of many homes for the elderly.
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accompanying urban growth. Neither
the extent of migration to urban areas
nor the direction of the flow is precise
ly known. Acceleration in urbanisation
over the next decade is however pro
jected, which means that urban
areas will face growing populations –
a trend which has far reaching impli
cations for infrastructure and service
delivery. Several municipal councils
are already struggling to deliver mini
mum levels of acceptable service
delivery, and, in future, as needs and
demands for infrastructure and servic
es mount, these councils will experi
ence increasing pressure. 
5. WHERE DOES ALL OF THIS
LEAVE SOUTH AFRICA IN
RESPECT OF POLICY-
MAKING AND ACTION?
A comprehensive and integrated
strategy is cardinally important to
address the overarching issues brought
about by current and projected
changes in the population structure.
The most important policy interventions
and adjustments necessitated by
demographic shifts were largely incor
porated in the form of development
objectives in the 1998 Population
Policy. However, the Population Policy
and other supporting programmes
require sustained allocation of finan
cial and human resources for them to
be effective in practice, while strong
and innovative alliances between the
authorities, the private sector and
other sectors are essentially important
to the mobilisation of the necessary
resources. To date, however, there
have, at the national level, been too
many signs of poor interdepartmental
cooperation, the virtual absence of
the private sector and a lack of
expertise – all factors which hamper
the streamlined implementation of
the Population Policy. From a policy
perspective South Africa can barely
afford the luxury of general, frag
mented and unfocused development
and planning actions. The available
expertise and resources will simply
have to be more strongly and more
effectively streamlined and focused
so that the country can position itself
in respect of the demographic
changes which are already sporadi
cally making their presence felt in var
ious fields.
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